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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN FAITH-BASED 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE WAKE OF 
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: BELIEVERS BEWARE 
Charles J. Russo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t’s certainly going to be an issue. I . . . don’t deny that. I 
don’t deny that, Justice Alito. . . . [I]t is going to be an issue.”1 
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s fateful words, uttered in 
response to a question posed by Justice Samuel Alito during 
oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 likely sent chills up 
the spines of leaders in faith-based educational institutions, 
from pre-schools to universities. In Obergefell, a bare majority 
                                                            
* B.A., 1972, St. John’s University; M. Div., 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate 
Conception; J.D., 1983, St. John’s University; Ed.D., 1989, St. John’s University; 
Panzer Chair in Education and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Dayton. I 
extend my appreciation to Dr. Paul Babie, D. Phil., Professor of Law and Legal Theory, 
Adelaide Law School, The University of Adelaide, Australia; Dr. David A. Dolph, Chair 
of the Department of Educational Leadership in the School of Education and Health 
Sciences, University of Dayton; Dr. Ralph Sharp, Associate Professor Emeritus, East 
Central University, Ada, Oklahoma; William E. Thro, General Counsel and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; and Professor Lynn D. Wardle, Bruce C. 
Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 
Provo, Utah for their useful comments on drafts of the manuscript. I would also like to 
thank my Assistant, Ms. Elizabeth Pearn, for proofreading the manuscript and helping 
to prepare it for publication. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not offer my greatest 
thanks and love to my wife, Debbie Russo, a fellow educator serving as a pre-school 
teacher, for proofreading and commenting on drafts of this article along with 
everything else that she does in our life together, not just for me but also for our 
children and grandchildren. 
 1  Transcript of Oral Argument, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1929996, at *38. This same language is 
cited in the proposed Federal First Amendment Defense Act: 
Sec. 2 (3) Nevertheless, in 2015, when asked whether a religious school could lose 
its tax-exempt status for opposing same-sex marriage, the Solicitor General of the 
United States represented to the United States Supreme Court that “[i]t’s 
certainly going to be an issue.” 
H. R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015), was introduced on June 17, 2015. For a more thorough 
discussion of this proposed law, see infra notes 173 et seq. and accompanying text. 
 2  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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of the Supreme Court legalized same-sex unions in the United 
States. Verrilli’s words, combined with the outcome in 
Obergefell, have a potentially chilling effect on religious 
freedom. The decision does not only impact educational 
institutions—the primary focus of this article—but also a wide 
array of houses of worship. Other religiously affiliated 
institutions that may be affected include health and social 
services agencies, such as those working with adoptions3 and 
ministering to the needy.4 These educational institutions and 
other agencies designed to assist the common good run the risk 
of being shuttered as a form of punishment, to the detriment of 
many, if they remain true to their faith—a decidedly un-
American prospect. 
As noted at the outset, Verrilli’s comment came in response 
to a question from Justice Alito. Justice Alito inquired: “[w]ell, 
in the Bob Jones case,5 the Court held that a college 
was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial 
marriage or interracial dating. So would the same apply to a 
university or a college if it opposed same-sex marriage?”6  
During the first oral argument in Obergefell, as part of a ninety 
minute session on whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to grant marriage licenses to two people of the 
                                                            
 3  See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 4  See John Agnew, Deus Vult: The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church, 15 
GEOPOLITICS 39, 47 (2010), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/391.pdf 
(stating that the Roman Catholic Church is “the largest single supplier of health 
services and education in the world.”). For example, 2014 data from a position 
statement by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops revealed that “645 
Catholic hospitals in the United States assist 87,972,910 patients annually; [o]ne in six 
patients in the U.S. is cared for in a Catholic hospital; [t]here are over 19.5 million 
emergency room visits and over 102 million outpatient visits in Catholic hospitals 
during a one-year period; [and] [o]ver  5.2 million patients are admitted to Catholic 
hospitals annually[.]”, Catholic Health Care and Social Services, U.S. CONF. OF 
BISHOPS, http://wwwmigrate.usccb.org/about/media-relations/backgrounders/health-
care-social-service-humanitarian-aid.cfm  (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 5  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (revoking the 
university’s tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, pursuant to which 
individuals who donated money were entitled to tax deductions on their federal income 
taxes, because its officials engaged in discriminatory admissions practices with regard 
to race when they refused to admit African-Americans and forbade interracial dating, 
based on the institution’s religious doctrine). For representative commentary, see 
William A. Drennan, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom will the Bell 
Toll?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1985); Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Bob 
Jones University v. United States: A Decision with Little Direction, 12 EDUC. L. REP. 
1039 (1983). 
 6  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at *38. 
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same sex, Chief Justice Roberts addressed a related question to 
the Solicitor General: 
Counsel, I’d like to follow up in a line of questioning that 
Justice Scalia started. We have a concession from 
your friend that clergy will not be required to perform same-
sex marriage, but there are going to be harder questions. 
Would a religious school that has married housing be 
required to afford such housing to same-sex couples?7 
Verrilli refused to answer the question directly, responding 
instead that “issues are going to arise no matter which way you 
decide this case, because these questions of accommodation are 
going to arise in situations in States where there is no same-
sex marriage . . . and, in fact, they have arisen many times.”8 
As noted in the opening sentence, this exchange raises serious 
concerns for the future of not-for-profit faith based schools, and 
other institutions that are admittedly beyond the scope of this 
article. Such questioning is serious because it seems to reveal 
governmental intent to punish believers for remaining faithful 
to teachings they have accepted for ages. 
As discussed below, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is 
bereft of constitutional analysis or grounding, particularly his 
analysis of the substantive due process right to liberty and 
equal protection. Even as he referred condescendingly to people 
of faith, Kennedy ostensibly sought to allay concerns that the 
imposition of same-sex unions on the United States via judicial 
fiat would negatively impact believers who seek to exercise 
their rights to religious freedom.9 As reflected by the stridency 
of the dissenting Justices,10 Kennedy’s musings did little to 
offer much in the way of protection for religious freedom. As a 
consequence of these trivial musings, supporters of Obergefell 
now hasten to enact legislation.11 
                                                            
 7  Id. at *36. 
 8  Id. at *37. 
 9  See Brian Walsh, Religious Freedom After the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex 
Marriage Decision, WASH. TIMES (D.C.) July 1, 2015, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/30/brian-walsh-religious-freedom-
after-supreme-courts/ (reporting that Obergefell “offers these Americans [of faith] 
decidedly scant reassurance.”). 
 10  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (voicing concern that Obergefell ”will be used to vilify Americans who are 
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy . . . by those who are determined to stamp out 
every vestige of dissent.”). 
 11  See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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Obergefell was handed down amid a growing body of actions 
demonstrating hostility to religion, not all of which have been 
litigated. The upshot of much of this activity is that it 
evidences a great deal of antipathy for Christianity. The 
attacks on Roman Catholicism in particular and its reverence 
for the Eucharist as the Body and Blood of Christ12 reveal that 
anti-Catholicism remains the “anti-Semitism of the 
intellectuals” (and progressives).13 Incidents evidencing the 
aforementioned trend have occurred both on and off campuses 
in an attempt to restrict, if not eliminate,14 religious and other 
forms of free speech15 at faith-based colleges and universities 
with overt Christian affiliations as well as public educational 
institutions.16 The goal of such concerted activities is 
apparently to restrict the free flow of ideas ,especially those of 
                                                            
 12  Members of the gay group ACT-UP chained themselves to pews in St. 
Patrick’s Cathedral, shouted down Cardinal O’Connor at a Sunday Mass before others, 
“received” Eucharist but spat it out, and desecrated the Sacrament by stepping on the 
consecrated hosts. While conceding that the protestors such as these undoubtedly 
represent a small fringe minority, this is a particularly egregious example and one can 
only wonder what kind of outrage this behavior might have stirred had it occurred in a 
house of worship of some other faith. See Mike Dorning, Animosity Over Gays 
Threatens St. Pat Parade: New York’s Irish March Will Go On, But Sexual Minority 
Plans a Protest, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1993, 1993 WLNR 4062014. The purported 
“newspaper of record” in New York City, the Times, did not initially report on this 
highly insensitive incident.  See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Tangle of Issues in St. Patrick’s 
Brouhaha, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at B3, 1992 WLNR 3351573; Sam Roberts, One 
More Time, With Turmoil: True to Tradition, St. Patrick’s Marchers Face Controversy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at B1, 1993 WLNR 3367862. 
 13  “It has been many years since the poet and essayist Peter Viereck called anti-
Catholicism ’the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals.’” wrote Peter Steinfels in Beliefs, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1997. Viereck’s actual words were that “Catholic-baiting is the anti-
Semitism of the liberals.” Peter Viereck, SHAME AND GLORY OF THE INTELLECTUALS 45 
(1953). While Viereck’s words are misquoted regularly, the spirit of his comment 
remains true. See Mark S. Massa, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA: THE LAST 
ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 7 (2003) (acknowledging anti-Catholicism as the “anti-
Semitism of the intellectuals”). 
 14  See, e.g., infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. 
 15  See, e.g., FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, PRAY TO PLAY: CHRISTIAN 
COACHES AND CHAPLAINS ARE CONVERTING FOOTBALL FIELDS INTO MISSION FIELDS 
(2015), http://ffrf.org/images/PraytoPlayReport.pdf. For a summary of the report, see 
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, State/Church Watchdog Issues Report 
Damning College Football Chaplains, Coaches, Aug. 17, 2015, http://ffrf.org/news/news-
releases/item/23528-state-church-watchdog-issues-report-damning-college-football-
chaplains-coaches (calling on officials at public colleges and universities to whom the 
report was sent to terminate the employment of chaplains, and instead hire counselors, 
or face legal action). 
 16  See infra note 149 for a brief discussion of Gay Rights Coalition v. 
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). 
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a religious nature, from the public marketplace of ideas (known 
as American higher education) in favor of the politically correct 
flavor of the day. 
Against this backdrop of threats to religious freedom on the 
post-Obergefell horizon, the remainder of this article is divided 
into three substantive parts. The first section briefly reviews 
recent Supreme Court judgments undercutting religious 
freedom when it comes into conflict with the interests of 
individuals who are gay, showing that the Justices have not 
sought to forge a path of compromise protecting the rights of 
persons on both sides of the issue. The first section also reviews 
the judicial history of Obergefell along with a summary, 
analysis, and critique of key portions of the Justices’ opinions. 
The second section reflects on the status of religious freedom 
for faith-based institutions and their employees, cautioning 
them to be aware of the coming legal battles at a time when 
some of their most cherished rights are under steady attack by 
those who would usher in a fundamental transformation of the 
United States leading to a “closing of the American mind.”17 
The fourth section discusses possible solutions for religiously 
affiliated institutions that feel threatened. The article rounds 
out with a brief reflection on the status of religious freedom in 
the United States. 
II. SUPREME COURT CASES 
This section briefly highlights three recent Supreme Court 
cases impacting religious freedom18 before focusing on the 
                                                            
 17  This idea mirrors the title of Allan Bloom’s seminal 1987 best-seller, The 
Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and 
Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students. 
 18  In fairness, the Supreme Court did uphold religious liberty in three other 
cases not involving issues of sexual preference that were decided during this time 
frame. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunities Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), a unanimous Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts, upheld the ministerial exception, reasoning that Church 
officials, rather that the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, had 
the right to decide who qualified as a minister. For commentary on this case, see 
Charles J. Russo & Paul E. McGreal, Religious Freedom in American Catholic Higher 
Education, 39 REL. & EDUC. 116 (2012). Two years later, in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), a five-to-four judgment authored by Justice Kennedy 
upheld a policy of a town governing board allowing its meetings to be opened with a 
prayer offered by a member of the clergy selected from the congregations listed in a 
local directory. For a commentary, see Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The 
Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71 
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Court’s judgment in Obergefell. 
A. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez19 involved a dispute 
from the public university, Hastings College of the Law, where 
Christian law students failed in their challenge to a campus 
policy.20 The policy forbade them from retaining their status as 
members of a recognized campus organization entitled to 
benefits unless they accepted individuals for leadership 
positions who did not share their values.21 The challenge arose 
because the Christian society required members and officers to 
sign a “Statement of Faith,” directing them to comply with its 
principles, such as the belief that sexual activity should not 
occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman.22 The 
Statement also refused affiliation to anyone who participated 
in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”23 
In a five-to-four judgment written by Justice Ginsburg, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of what campus 
officials described as their “all-comers” policy.24 Under this 
policy, groups had to accept all persons for leadership roles, 
even if individuals did not share in organizational values or 
missions. Justice Alito’s dissent sought to invalidate the all-
comers policy as unreasonably infringing on the rights of 
members of the Society because it placed a substantial burden 
                                                                                                                                     
(2014). During the same term, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), in a 
five-to-four opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court decided that insofar as closely 
held for-profit corporations are legal persons, they do not have to comply with 
regulations imposing an abortifacient mandate that are not part of the Affordable 
Health Care Act. The Court reasoned that even if the government had a compelling 
interest in mandating such coverage, it substantially burdened the free exercise of the 
owners’ right to religious freedom in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
because the regulations failed to achieve their goal in the least restrictive manner and 
so conflicted with the owners’ deeply held religious beliefs. 
 19  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661 (2010). For a much more detailed analysis of this case, see William E. Thro & 
Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 473 (2010). See also Zachary R. Cormier, 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: The Death Knell of Associational Freedom on the 
College Campus, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 287 (2011). 
 20  Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 662. 
 21  Id. at 661. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 24  Id. at 669. 
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on their free exercise of religion.25 Although the law school 
officials had not relied on the “all-comers” policy until the 
Christian group challenged the denial of its request for 
recognized status, the Court rejected the concerns of the 
students and Justice Alito’s dissent that the policy imposed a 
significant restriction on religious freedom. 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Society’s 
remaining claims that university officials violated their right to 
religious freedom.26 The court rejected this because the 
Society’s leaders failed to preserve their argument that officials 
selectively applied the policy. 
B. United States v. Windsor 
United States v. Windsor27 was decided on the same day as 
Hollingsworth v. Perry.28 Windsor, which was decided on the 
merits of the claim, rather than on the procedural question of 
standing over the status of same-sex unions, has significant 
potential to impact operations in faith-based educational 
institutions at all levels. Windsor arose when a taxpayer in 
New York, as the surviving partner of a same-sex couple, 
successfully challenged29 being denied the benefit of a spousal 
tax deduction due to definition of “marriage” and “spouse” 
provided in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).30 In response 
to the plaintiff’s suit seeking a refund of federal estate taxes as 
well as a declaration that the pertinent provision of DOMA 
could not deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment,31 the Supreme Court affirmed an 
                                                            
 25  Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts along with Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
 26  See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 27  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For representative 
commentary on this case, see Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” 
in United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
935 (2014); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and 
the Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045 (2014); Jamie 
L. Johnson, DOMA: Turning the Love Boat into the Titanic How the United States v. 
Windsor Opinion Affects Maritime Law, 14 LOY. MAR. L.J. 408 (2015). 
 28  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct 2652 (2013). 
 29  A federal trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 833 F. Supp. 
2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) and the Second Circuit affirmed on her behalf, 699 F.3d 169 
(2nd Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
 30  Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 31  In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment reads: “No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law[.]” 
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earlier order in her favor.  
In a five-to-four judgment authored by Justice Kennedy,32 
the Supreme Court invalidated DOMA, regarding it as an 
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to liberty of the person 
protected by the Fifth Amendment because it defined marriage 
as a union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.33 
The Court added that this definition operated to deprive same-
sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities accompanying 
the federal recognition of their marriages, thereby placing a 
stigma on those who entered into same-sex unions.34 
According to Justice Kennedy, “[i]n determining whether a 
law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, 
‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ . . . require careful 
consideration.”35 Absent any proof of a discriminatory animus, 
Kennedy added that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect [of DOMA] to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”36 
Disagreeing vociferously with Kennedy, Justice Scalia 
rejected the majority’s assertion “that the motivation for 
DOMA was to ‘demean’;” to “‘impose inequality’;” to “‘impose . . 
. a stigma’;” to deny people ‘equal dignity’;” to brand gay people 
as ‘unworthy’;” and to “‘humiliat[e]’.”37 Scalia questioned the 
Supreme Court’s authority to invalidate legislation enacted as 
part of the democratic process. This is an issue of the Court’s 
authority again came to the fore in Obergefell, wherein the 
Court essentially granted the judiciary supremacy over 
Congress and the president. The Court granted itself such 
power even though Congress enacted DOMA in 1996 by 
margins of 342 to 67 in the House of Representatives38 and 85 
to 14 in the Senate.39 President Bill Clinton subsequently 
                                                            
 32  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
 33  Chief Justice Roberts at 133 S. Ct. 2696 filed a dissenting opinion. Justice 
Scalia, id. at 2697, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas and in 
which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Part I. Justice Alito, id. at 2711, filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts II and III. 
 34  Id. at 2693. 
 35  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (2013) (citations omitted). 
 36  Id. at 2697. 
 37  Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and emphasis omitted). 
 38  142 CONG. REC. 103, H7505 (daily ed. July 12, 1996). 
 39  142 CONG. REC. 123, S10129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). 
2.Russo.Proof2.263-308.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/2/16  5:46 PM 
2] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND OBERGEFELL 271 
 
signed DOMA into law. 
In light of DOMA’s legislative history, it is puzzling at best 
why Kennedy made such a sweeping and ultimately mean-
spirited statement about DOMA’s legislative intent absent 
evidence, especially insofar as the Court’s dramatic action was 
virtually unthinkable as recently as fifteen or twenty years 
ago. However, this much is certain: Justice Kennedy’s 
statements on behalf of the Court invalidating DOMA—
essentially describing supporters of marriage between one man 
and one woman as being motivated by hate and refusing to 
recognize legitimate religious beliefs—should serve as a stark 
warning to religious leaders about the precarious status of the 
Free Exercise Clause as well as the conflicts to come.  
Moreover, in light of Justice Alito’s comment that believers 
may be vilified40 for remaining true to their faiths, it remains to 
be seen what may happen to faith-based schools for continuing 
to teach the values their religions have sincerely held through 
the ages. 
C. Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Hollingsworth v. Perry41 arose when same-sex couples who 
were denied marriage licenses due to California’s Proposition 8 
sued the Governor and various state officials. Proposition 8 was 
a voter-enacted ballot initiative amending the state 
Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and 
a woman was valid. The plaintiffs successfully alleged that the 
initiative eliminated their right to marry while violating their 
rights to due process and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 
Without reaching the merits of the underlying claims, in 
another five-to-four judgment, this one authored by Chief 
                                                            
 40  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 41  133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), on remand, 725 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction). For representative commentary on this case, see, e.g., Matthew 
A. Melone & George A. Nation III, “Standing” on 
Formality: Hollingsworth v. Perry and the Efficacy of Direct Democracy in the United 
States, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 25 (2014); Glenn S. Koppel, “Standing” In the Shadow of 
Erie: Federalism in the Balance in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 34 PACE L. REV. 631 (2014). 
 42  Starting with Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal.  2010), 
this case had a lengthy procedural history culminating in Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), rehearing en banc denied, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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Justice Roberts,43 the Court affirmed an earlier order that the 
plaintiffs lacked the ability to intervene to defend the 
initiative. More specifically, the Court maintained that private 
parties lack standing44 to defend the constitutionality of state 
statutes because the plaintiffs had what the Court described as 
an individualized grievance and they were not agents of the 
State,45 even where public officials charged with the duty to do 
so chose not to act.46  As with Windsor, arguably less to the 
point insofar as it primarily addressed standing, if supporters 
of same sex unions are unwilling to demonstrate the tolerance 
of religious institutions that they demand in return, then faith 
based schools may be subject to litigation ultimately resulting 
in their financial demise. 
D. Obergefell v. Hodges 
1. Facts and judicial history 
The facts in Obergefell are as straightforward as Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion was fractured. The litigation began 
when fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex 
partners were deceased successfully filed suit in Michigan,47 
Kentucky,48 Ohio,49 and Tennessee50 to obtain marriage licenses 
or recognition of their partnerships. All of the jurisdictions, 
which make up the Sixth Circuit, defined marriage as being 
between one man and one woman. The courts ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs who alleged that the statutory and state 
constitutional provisions at issue violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have 
their marriages that were performed in other jurisdictions 
recognized where they lived. 
On further review, the Sixth Circuit consolidated the 
                                                            
 43   See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (Chief Justice Roberts delivered the 
opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.). 
 44  Id. at 2666. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Interestingly, although he was author of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Windsor, Justice Kennedy filed a dissent at 2668 which was joined by Justices Thomas, 
Alito, and Sotomayor. 
 47  DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 48  Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 49  Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Henry v. 
Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 50  Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
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actions into one case, reversing in favor of the states on the 
ground that their officials did not have constitutional duties to 
grant licenses to same-sex couples who wished to marry or to 
recognize such arrangements entered into in other 
jurisdictions.51 Not surprisingly, the advocates appealed to the 
Supreme Court which reversed in their favor, establishing 
same-sex unions as the law of the land by judicial fiat in a 
closely divided opinion. 
2. Justice Kennedy for the Court. 
At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, in a 
five-to-four judgment,52 identified the two questions before the 
Court. He stated that, 
The first, presented by the cases from Michigan and 
Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a 
State to license a marriage between two people of the same 
sex. The second, presented by the cases from Ohio, Tennessee, 
and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed 
and performed in a State which does grant that right.53 
Justice Kennedy devoted the first four sections of his 
analysis to the first issue, but a scant three paragraphs to the 
second question. 
Justice Kennedy opened his analysis by paying lip service 
to the centrality of marriage, citing to no less a figure than 
Cicero.54 In so doing, Kennedy conceding that “[i]t is fair and 
necessary to say these references were based on the 
understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of 
the opposite sex.”55 
The second section of the opinion began with Justice 
Kennedy’s musings about changes in marriage over the years 
such as appropriately affording women greater roles and 
                                                            
 51  DeBoer v. Snyder 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 52  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent was joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justice Thomas. 
Justice Thomas’s dissent was joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Alito’s dissent was joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
 53  Id. at 2593. 
 54  See id. at 2594 (Cicero wrote, “The first bond of society is marriage; next, 
children; and then the family.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 55  Id. 
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ensuring their equality; he aptly described such 
transformations as helping to strengthen the institution of 
marriage. Using this as a departure point, Kennedy embarked 
on a review of attitudes toward those in same-sex 
relationships, noting that until relatively recently, 
homosexuality was considered a psychological illness.56 Later in 
the twentieth century, he pointed out, same-sex couples began 
to lead more open lives and establish their own families which, 
in turn, led to litigation over their status. 
Moving into the heart of his order, Justice Kennedy 
reviewed the evolution of key litigation starting with Bowers v. 
Hardwick.57 Bowers was the first case in which the Court 
addressed the status of homosexuals,58 but it upheld the 
constitutionality of a law from Georgia criminalizing a variety 
of intimate acts between homosexuals. Justice Kennedy 
observed that change was in the offing, starting with his own 
opinion in Romer v. Evans,59 in which the Court invalidated a 
provision of the Colorado Constitution intended to deny 
protection to individuals based on their sexual orientations as 
lacking a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. 
Justice Kennedy identified his 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas as the big breakthrough with regard to gay lifestyles.60 
Justice Kennedy remarked that not only did Lawrence strike 
down as unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime for 
two consenting males to engage in specified intimate sexual 
conduct in the privacy of their home, but also explicitly 
overturned Bowers. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in the 
same year as Bowers, Congress enacted, and President Clinton 
signed into law, DOMA.61 DOMA defined marriage as being 
between one man and one woman, a definition that the Court 
subsequently invalidated in Windsor.62 
With Romer as a kind of impetus, Justice Kennedy 
                                                            
 56  See id. at 2596. 
 57  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1988). 
 58  The author is aware that “gay” has replaced homosexual, but uses the word 
when it appears in the Court’s opinion. 
 59  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 60  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 61  1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 62  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. Supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Windsor. 
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documented how lower courts63 entered the fray. To this end, 
Justice Kennedy commented that only the case at bar and a 
dispute from the Eighth Circuit64 deviated from the judicial 
norm that preventing same-sex couples from being allowed to 
marry was unconstitutional.65 Justice Kennedy entered the 
third, and lengthiest, part of his analysis by citing the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to 
which “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.’”66 He added that 
fundamental liberties include “intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs.”67 Even so, Justice Kennedy 
conceded that the Court has yet to devise a formula in 
protecting such fundamental rights. In an unintended irony, 
Justice Kennedy determined that those who “wrote and ratified 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, 
and so they entrusted to future generations a charter 
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn 
its meaning,”68 essentially providing cover for the judicial 
activism displayed in the remainder of his order. 
After a brief review of cases wherein the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Constitution as protecting the right to marry,69 
Justice Kennedy made a quantum judicial leap. Lacking 
precedent to support his position, he declared that “[i]t cannot 
be denied that this Court’s cases describing the right to marry 
presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.”70 
Justice Kennedy then identified four principles and traditions 
under which he applied the constitutional principles associated 
with marriage to same-sex couples. 
Justice Kennedy went on to say that “[a] first premise of the 
                                                            
 63  See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Hawaii 1993) (although not 
imposing same-sex unions as a matter of law, the court declared that a law restricting 
marriage on the basis of sex was subject to strict scrutiny); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Mass. 2003) (determining that limiting the “protections, 
benefits and obligations of civil marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked [a] 
rational basis and violated the state constitutional equal protection principles.”). 
 64  Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 65  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608–09. 
 66  Id. at 2597. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 2598. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
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Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy.”71 It is certainly true, as he declared, that decisions 
about marriage and family are among the most intimate 
individuals can make, shaping their destinies in enduring 
bonds. However, Justice Kennedy failed to make the case why 
members of same-sex unions who cannot procreate should have 
the same rights to marriage, and why religious believers and 
institutions should run the risk of being charged with 
discrimination if they disagree with the vision he shared with 
the advocates and amici behind Obergefell. 
Kennedy started with the fair proposition that the right “to 
marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals.”72 However, he stopped short of explaining why 
same-sex unions can be allowed to change the meaning of 
marriage that has stood the test of ages. 
In another unintended irony, Kennedy observed that “[a] 
third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it 
safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from 
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”73 
While this is accurate—and  readily conceding that same-sex 
couples can provide loving homes to children, without 
considering the psychological impact on their well-being—he  
once more failed to justify why it was necessary to allow five 
unelected-judges to radically redefine marriage rather than 
allow changes to play out through the democratic process. If 
anything, this section of his opinion stands out as 
shortsightedly placing the primary focus on the desires of 
adults rather than the needs of children, seemingly putting the 
cart before the horse in terms of sound child-rearing. 
The final premise that Justice Kennedy touched on was the 
belief that “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make 
clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”74 After 
reciting various aspects of marriage such as inheritance and 
property rights, visitation rights in hospitals, and medical 
decision-making power—all  of which can be available without 
                                                            
 71  Id. at 2599. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. at 2600. 
 74  Id. at 2601. 
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redefining marriage—he  recognized marriage as being at the 
center of a multitude of aspects in American social life and 
order. In describing marriage as being at the center of life, 
Justice Kennedy was of the view that insofar as there is no 
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, 
excluding the former from this arrangement denied them many 
state benefits. He maintained that such exclusions demean 
gays and lesbians because it prevents them from enjoying the 
fundamental right to marry and, in so doing, rejected 
arguments to the contrary.75 
Kennedy sought to buttress his assertion that the right to 
marry is a form of liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and expanded his view to describe it as a synergy 
working in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause. 76 
Insofar as Justice Kennedy failed to support his position by 
discussing equal protection analysis, Chief Justice Roberts 
later took him to task for this omission.77 Justice Kennedy 
commented that the Court’s equal protection analysis “has 
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can 
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental 
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged[,]”78 a 
claim that Justice Scalia scathingly rejected.79 In doing so, 
Justice Kennedy cited to an array of equal protection cases, 
particularly his own opinion in Lawrence, arguing that the 
marriage laws at issue limited both the liberty and equal 
protection rights of the petitioners by imposing continuing 
harms on them that he was unable to identify.  One can only 
wonder how this will play out if same sex couples wish to enroll 
their children in faith based schools even though they openly 
live in a manner inconsistent with the express teachings of the 
governing religious bodies of these institutions. 
In the fourth section of his analysis, Justice Kennedy 
unconvincingly sought to rebut the dissenters who reasoned 
that the Court acted too hastily, shortchanging the democratic 
process by imposing same-sex unions as the law of the land. 
Rejecting a call for caution in creating a new fundamental 
                                                            
 75  See id. at 2602. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 78  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 79  Id. at 2631. 
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right, Justice Kennedy worried that any other result would 
have inflicted pain and humiliation on gays and lesbians, 
creating grave harm to their dignity.80 
In the final paragraph of the fourth section, and a scant five 
paragraphs from the end of his opinion,—perhaps 
inadvertently demonstrating that the Court did not view 
religious liberty as deserving a more central role in its order—
Justice  Kennedy unpersuasively sought to allay the concerns 
of believers: 
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who 
adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with 
utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex 
marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment 
ensures that religious organizations and persons are given 
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are 
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to 
their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure 
they have long revered.81  
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy spoke of the rights of 
believers to advocate and teach their positions. Yet, just as in 
Windsor, he failed to demonstrate any respect for the positions 
of people of faith early in his opinion and wrote little about 
concrete protections they would be afforded to safeguard their 
constitutional right to freedom of religion. 
In the briefest and final section of the Court’s opinion, 
Justice Kennedy addressed “whether the Constitution requires 
States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out 
of State.”82 He summarily found that if same-sex couples can 
exercise their right to enter marriages in their home states, 
there is no lawful ground on which to refuse to recognize such 
unions if they are performed in other jurisdictions. He thus 
concluded by granting the petitioners the right to be equal to 
opposite-sex couples under the law. 
3.  Dissenting Opinions 
a. Chief Justice Roberts.  Chief Justice Roberts’s fairly lengthy 
dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
conceded at its outset that the petitioners made strong 
                                                            
 80  See Id. at 2607. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
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arguments, and acknowledged that eleven states and the 
District of Columbia allow same-sex unions.83 At the same time, 
though, he stressed that the judicial branch was meant to 
determine what the law is, not make it or redefine it, a theme 
running through the dissents. Roberts added that “this Court is 
not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea 
should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges 
have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”84 
In the following paragraph, Roberts added that compelling 
policy arguments in support of redefining marriage aside, no 
such legal arguments existed, emphasizing that “[t]he 
fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a 
state change its definition of marriage.”85 Further, he described 
the Court’s ruling as “an act of will, not [a] legal judgment”86 
because the majority essentially confused its own preferences 
with what the law requires in its headlong rush to bypass the 
democratic process. At this point, Roberts made his first of 
sixteen, mostly highly critical, references to Lochner v. New 
York. In Lochner, the Court invalidated a law designed to 
regulate the number of hours bakers could work in a day or 
week. 87 The Lochner Court struck the law down as an 
unnecessary interference with the liberty to enter into 
contracts protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief 
Justice Roberts later cautioned that the Court avoid the same 
mistake as in Lochner by “converting personal preferences into 
constitutional mandates”88 that might impact the ability of 
faith-based schools to operate. 
Roberts then specified that his dissent was not about the 
Court’s action in changing the definition of marriage. Rather, 
he emphasized that he was concerned with whether such an 
important task as redefining marriage should have been left to 
the people and the democratic process instead of five lawyers 
                                                            
 83  Id. at 2611. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. at 2612. 
 87  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For representative commentary on 
this case, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
873 (1987); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1  (1991). 
 88  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618. 
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assigned to resolve legal disputes.89 
Part one of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on his 
concern over the majority’s having paid lip service to marriage 
as it existed over the millennia even as its own “precedents 
have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent 
with its traditional meaning.”90 Amid shifting public opinion 
and the workings of the political process, he was dismayed by 
how the Court ignored the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, which 
would have left the decision in the hands of voters.91 
Chief Justice Roberts opened the second part of his dissent 
by criticizing Justice Kennedy’s four “principles and 
traditions,” reasoning that they lacked a basis in either except 
for the “unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that 
characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner.”92 Chief 
Justice Roberts discussed the nature of the petitioners’ 
fundamental rights claim, noting that they viewed marriage 
not as an enumerated right, which it clearly never was. 
Instead, he observed that the petitioners relied on the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause as including a substantive aspect designed to protect 
liberties that are so deeply grounded in American society as to 
be considered fundamental and cannot be denied absent a 
compelling governmental interest. 
The Chief Justice went on to debunk the majority’s reliance 
on cases dealing with the right to marriage such as Loving v. 
Virginia, wherein the Supreme Court invalidated a ban on 
interracial marriage.93 He distinguished the earlier cases from 
the current issue to the extent that the petitioners in Obergefell 
desired same-sex unions while the precedents on which they 
relied addressed the traditional definition of marriage as being 
between one man and one woman.  Expanding on his rationale, 
Chief Justice Roberts thought that the petitioners inaptly 
relied on Griswold v. Connecticut,94 wherein the Court struck 
down a ban on contraceptives, and Lawrence v. Texas,95 
                                                            
 89  Id. at 2612. 
 90  Id. at 2614. 
 91  See id. at 2615. 
 92  Id. at 2616. 
 93  See id. at 2619; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 94  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 95  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. See supra note 60 for a brief discussion of 
Lawrence. 
2.Russo.Proof2.263-308.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/2/16  5:46 PM 
2] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND OBERGEFELL 281 
 
discussed earlier. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the cases 
the petitioners relied on touched on different dimensions of 
privacy in light of the intimate conduct of individuals in same-
sex unions. However, he rejected the application of these cases 
insofar as the right they pursued was anything but private 
because they were seeking public recognition of their relations, 
accompanied by governmental benefits. 
Remarking that the majority was unable to find genuine 
support in the Court’s precedent, he suggested that the only 
case it could rely on was his bette noir of the day, Lochner, 
which he criticized in four references over three paragraphs. 
Chief Justice Roberts was troubled because rather than 
proceed slowly in defining fundamental rights in light of the 
“debacle” of Lochner, “the majority casts caution aside and 
revives the grave errors of that period.”96 Reviewing the 
majority’s reliance on Lochner to argue that permitting same-
sex unions would not harm themselves or others, Chief Justice 
Roberts pointed out that what he described as the “harm 
principle” was more of a philosophical than legal position.97 
Rejecting this approach, Roberts maintained “that when 
unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws” via 
the democratic process in “discovering” implied fundamental 
rights, “they do so based on something more than their own 
beliefs.”98 This approach, however, was absent in Obergefell. 
In the third, and briefest, part of his dissent, the Chief 
Justice rebutted the majority’s reliance on what he described 
as an inapt synergy between the Equal Protection99 and Due 
                                                            
 96  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621. 
 97  Id. at 2622. 
 98  Id. at 2622–23. 
 99  Briefly stated, according to the Equal Protection Clause, “No state shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV, § 1. Further, under equal protection analysis, individuals or groups that are 
“similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 439 (1985). 
  In equal protection analysis cases, “. . . if a law neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold the legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer, 517 
U.S. at 631. Conversely, classifications based on constitutionally suspect factors such 
as race, legislatively protected categories such as race, or fundamental constitutional 
rights are unlikely to survive strict scrutiny unless they serve compelling governmental 
interests that are narrowly tailored to achieve their goals. While not using this  
language, the Court essentially applied this standard in Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Amazingly, though, the Court applied rational basis in Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese-
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Process Clauses.100 Chief Justice Roberts rejected this approach 
because he was of the view that the majority neither framed 
the dispute within the usual framework for an equal protection 
claim nor made more than conclusory claims to explain how or 
why this clause provided an alternative justification for the 
outcome. If anything, he was convinced that an equal 
protection claim should have failed because treating same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples in the same manner is “rationally 
related to States’ ‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving the 
traditional institution of marriage.’”101 
Briefly stated, in the final portion of his dissent, Chief 
Justice Roberts ruminated on how the majority essentially 
ignored the democratic process, instead making itself the 
supreme law of the land. To this end, and as witnessed by 
ongoing controversy over abortion, he presciently wrote that 
“[p]eople denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a 
court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of things 
courts usually decide.”102 
Turning to what may be described as the issue of the day, 
the Chief Justice addressed his concerns about how the Court’s 
imposition of same-sex unions would impact religious freedom. 
In fact, he highlighted how the Solicitor General 
“acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious 
institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex 
marriage,”103 adding that this and similar questions would soon 
be subject to litigation because “people of faith can take no 
comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority 
today.”104 Rounding out this part of his dissent, the Chief 
                                                                                                                                     
Americans during World War II based on their ancestry). When courts apply the 
compelling interest test, governmental actions typically fail. 
  Other classifications, such as illegitimacy, alienage, and gender, are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. This standard is not as difficult for the government to meet as 
the compelling interest test since it involves less deference to legislation than rational 
relations. Under this test, the Supreme Court refuses to uphold classifications unless 
they bear “substantial relationships” to “important” governmental interests. The case  
coming closest to applying this standard in a school setting was Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) (upholding the rights of children who were undocumented residents to 
attend public schools), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982), even though the majority did 
not clearly indicate that it was applying this test. 
 100  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623. 
 101  Id. (citing to Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585) (citations omitted). 
 102  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625. 
 103  Id. at 2626 (citations omitted). 
 104  Id. 
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Justice disagreed with the way in which the majority 
repeatedly denigrated people who believe in the understanding 
of marriage that has existed throughout history. He feared that 
Kennedy’s gratuitous, unfounded, and ultimately mean-
spirited “assaults on the character of fairminded [sic] people 
will have an effect, in society and in court”105 for years to come.  
As noted throughout, these kinds of attitudes can have direct 
impacts on faith based institutions insofar as they may not 
survive challenges to the ability to retain their values or close. 
Chief Justice Roberts ended his dissent on a note of caution. 
He suggested that those who were happy with the outcome in 
Obergefell would be able to celebrate the Court’s holding but 
they could not celebrate the Constitution because the judgment 
from which he was dissenting had nothing to do with the 
Constitution.106 
b. Justice Scalia.  Justice Scalia’s brief, pointed dissent, which 
was joined by Justice Thomas,107 began with his assertion that 
his larger concern was not so much the way in which marriage 
is defined, but how a bare majority of nine judges can impose 
their will over 320 million Americans.108 He pointed out that 
until the Court put an end to it, the American people 
demonstrated democracy at its best by engaging in a spirited 
debate over how to define marriage. In fact, he acknowledged 
that proponents of same-sex unions succeeded in eleven states 
even as advocates continued to press their arguments in 
public.109 
Justice Scalia chided the majority for mistakenly relying on 
the Fourteenth Amendment to remove this debate from the 
political process. He explained that when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868, all states defined marriage as 
being between one man and one woman with little doubt of its 
constitutionality.110 Justice Scalia believed that insofar as the 
Court lacked the authority to invalidate a set of laws not 
expressly forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, its 
judgment was nothing more than “a naked judicial claim to 
                                                            
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at 2626. 
 107  Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 108  Id. at 2627. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. at 2628. 
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legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim 
fundamentally at odds with our system of government.”111 
Continuing his criticism of what he described as a “judicial 
Putsch,” Scalia excoriated the majority for having 
discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a ‘fundamental 
right’ overlooked by every person alive at the time of 
ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since 
[seeing] what lesser legal minds [such as] . . . Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., . . . Louis Brandeis, William Howard Taft, 
Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, . . . could 
not.112 
He thus characterized the opinion as “couched in a style 
that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.”113 In sum, 
suffice it to say that Justice Scalia’s dissent warned the Court 
that its overreaching had it marching inexorably “one step 
closer to being reminded of our impotence.”114 
c. Justice Thomas.  Justice Thomas’s dissent, which was 
joined by Justice Scalia,115 largely addressed the constitutional 
notion of liberty that played a large part in the Court’s 
rationale. He began by providing a detailed history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that it traced its origins to the 
Magna Carta.116 In so doing, Justice Thomas also reviewed the 
history of the Fifth Amendment and its narrow use of the term 
“liberty,” suggesting that this limited approach likely applied to 
the Fifth Amendment as well.117 He finished this point by 
observing that the Court’s earliest uses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “appear to interpret the Clause as using ‘liberty’ to 
                                                            
 111  Id. at 2629. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 2630. 
 114  Id. at 2631. In light of Scalia’s statement, “[a] new Rasmussen Reports 
national telephone survey [released on July 24, 2015] finds that 36% of Likely U.S. 
Voters still think the high court is doing a good or excellent job, but that’s down from 
the recent high of 38% measured just after the court issued its rulings in June.” The 
data were gathered in response to the question “How would you rate the way the 
Supreme Court is doing its job,”? in a survey of 1,000 likely voters taken  July 21-22, 
2015. The responses as broken down were: Excellent, 9%; Good, 27%; Fair 30%; Poor 
31%; Not sure, 3%. Supreme Court Update What do Voters Think of the Supreme Court 
Now? RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 24, 2015), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/politics/mood_of_america/supreme_court_update. 
 115  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 116  Id. at 2632. 
 117  Id. at 2633. 
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mean freedom from physical restraint,” which would not 
include the liberty to recreate marriage. 118 
Having narrowed the scope of the term “liberty,” Justice 
Thomas showed that liberty in this context refers to being free 
from government action in the form of physical restraints and 
imprisonment rather than an entitlement to benefits.119 
Moreover, he was of the opinion that regardless of how one 
defined liberty, the petitioners had not lost their liberty 
because they were neither restrained nor imprisoned as a 
consequence of having entered into same-sex relationships.120 
Rather, he acknowledged that the petitioners were free to 
cohabit, raise children, and were left alone to live as they 
wished without any restrictions on their daily lives.121 
What the petitioners really wanted, Justice Thomas 
maintained, were entitlements to the benefits of marriage that 
they claimed existed because of the government.122 According to 
Justice Thomas, among the benefits the petitioners sought 
were a governmental imprimatur on their relationships via 
official forms and a variety of monetary benefits such as 
reductions in death taxes.123 Justice Thomas determined that 
the Founders would have allowed the petitioners to do as they 
were doing: exchange vows, raise children, and live free from 
governmental interference.124 Justice Thomas even cited to 
Locke who wrote that, “[t]he first society was between man and 
wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and 
children.”125 Thomas rejected the petitioners’ misunderstanding 
of marriage, and reminded the majority that it was dealing 
with a negative liberty, which protects people from restrictions 
rather than granting them positive rights such as those the 
petitioners sought.126 
Justice Thomas also identified two areas, the political 
process and religious liberty, in which the Court’s 
misunderstanding of liberty would likely cause collateral 
                                                            
 118  Id. at 2634. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 2635. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 2635–36. 
 123  Id. at 2636. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 2636 (citations omitted). 
 126  Id. at 2635. 
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damages. He feared that the Court undermined the political 
process by disrespecting its ability to respect liberty. Justice 
Thomas remarked that the political process had been working 
robustly in light of debate, evidenced by voters in thirty-two of 
the thirty-five states who were afforded the opportunity to 
reframe marriage and chose to retain its traditional definition 
as being between one man and one woman.127 
Turning to religious liberty, Justice Thomas worried that 
the Court’s judgment would result in conflict between the 
government and religious institutions as well as people of faith. 
In particular, he feared that the majority was unconcerned by 
the fact that such conflict would arise, even though it is already 
happening when “individuals and churches are confronted with 
demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between 
same-sex couples.”128 He thus voiced his concern over the Court 
having short-circuited the political process by refusing to leave 
the definition of marriage to the voters, a process that had been 
well under way. Had the Court done as Justice Thomas 
interpreted the Constitution required, the people would have 
taken the impact of changing the definition of marriage into 
consideration rather than risk the potentially “ruinous 
consequences for religious liberty”129 resulting from its order. 
d. Justice Alito.  Justice Alito opened his dissent, which was 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,130 by declaring that the 
Court overstepped its boundaries insofar as the Constitution’s 
silence on marriage left it as a matter to be resolved by the 
States.131 At this point, he rebutted Justice Kennedy’s Liberty 
Clause arguments noting that five unelected Justices misused 
their authority to impose their will on the American people.132 
He retorted that although the Court focused on the happiness 
of those who choose to marry, this approach is inconsistent 
with the traditional view over the millennia which defined 
marriage as involving opposite-sex couples for the purpose of 
procreation.133 
                                                            
 127  Id. at 2638. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. at 2639. 
 130  Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. at 2641. 
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Alito conceded that marriage has changed in the twenty-
first century, acknowledging that more than 40% of children in 
the United States are born to unmarried women.134 Yet, he did 
not agree that this changed the traditional view of marriage. 
Citing to his dissent in Windsor, he emphasized that the Court 
lacked the power to prevent States from preserving the 
traditional view of marriage as being between one man and one 
woman.135 
Insofar as he viewed the majority’s opinion as usurping the 
right of the People to decide whether to keep the traditional 
view of marriage, Alito sounded the alarm that the Court’s 
rationale would have other consequences, such as “be[ing] used 
to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new 
orthodoxy.”136 Reiterating that the power to define marriage 
should have been left to the states, Alito worried that “[b]y 
imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority 
facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who 
have traditional ideas.”137 Alito conceded that the majority 
sought to allay the concerns of believers. Yet, he remained 
deeply concerned that “those who cling to old beliefs will be 
able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, 
but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being 
labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, 
employers, and  schools.”138 
III. REFLECTIONS ON THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION CONCERNS 
As voiced by Justice Alito, there is a significant risk that in 
the post-Obergefell world, the Supreme Court’s ruling “will be 
used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new 
orthodoxy . . . by those who are determined to stamp out every 
vestige of dissent.”139 Such a situation may occur—paeans from 
Obergefell’s progressive supporters to the value of diversity and 
openness notwithstanding—as long as one concurs with the 
reigning progressive orthodoxy of the day. 
                                                            
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 2642. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 2643. 
 138  Id. at 2642–43. 
 139  Id. at 2642. 
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Opponents of Christianity, often led by those “on the 
political left . . . [who] have taken to calling themselves and 
their causes ‘progressive,’”140 rather than liberal, are typically 
the antithesis of open-mindedness to views not conforming with 
their own. If these critics of Christianity are successful in 
marginalizing and excluding Christians’ voices from public life, 
even though Christianity’s role was essential in the founding of 
the Republic, it would be a detriment to all because of the 
profoundly positive impact, with occasional pitfalls, that 
Christianity’s teachings have generally had on American 
society. 
Should Justice Alito’s fear about the vilification of believers 
come to fruition, it is likely to transpire at the hands of their 
progressive opponents who apparently seek to deny tax-exempt 
status to faith-based institutions. Such a change would have a 
significantly negative impact on the ability of leaders in many 
religiously-affiliated, non-public educational institutions to 
make decisions for their schools, and would be detrimental to 
untold millions of students and their families, not to mention 
the wider society to which they have contributed so greatly.141 
The condescending tone in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion—his  diktat that those who disagree lack a “better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives 
define a liberty”142 such as the right to same-sex unions—along 
with Justice Kennedy’s comments in Windsor143—demonstrate 
that there is a clear lack of respect for the sincerely held beliefs 
                                                            
 140  Michael Allan Wolf, Looking Backward: Richard Epstein Ponders the 
“Progressive” Peril, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1245, n.50 (2007). 
 141  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247–48 
(1968) (upholding loans of texts books for secular subjects to all students in New York, 
including those who attended religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools 
(The decision acknowledged 
that private education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in 
raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience. Americans care 
about the quality of the secular education available to their children. They have 
considered high quality education to be an indispensable ingredient for achieving 
the kind of nation, and the kind of citizenry, that they have desired to create. 
Considering this attitude, the continued willingness to rely on private school 
systems, including parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of 
informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an 
acceptable job of providing secular education to their students. This judgment is 
further evidence that parochial schools are performing, in addition to their 
sectarian function, the task of secular education.)). 
(citations omitted). 
 142  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 143  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. 
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of those who disagree with the progressive position. 
An analysis of Obergefell reveals three initial concerns with 
this deeply flawed decision that could influence the future of 
faith-based educational institutions. First, as illustrated by the 
dissent, a strong argument can be made that a bare majority of 
the Supreme Court exceeded its authority, acting as a kind of 
super legislature, in interpreting the Liberty Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by relying on the long discredited 
Lochner doctrine. Roberts relied on Lochner, at least in part, to 
mandate the imposition of same-sex unions in jurisdictions 
where voters chose to retain the traditional view of marriage 
and, in doing so, side-stepped the democratic process that was 
underway.144 Indeed, as was highlighted by the dissenting 
opinions, it is a stretch to describe Obergefell as being grounded 
in any kind of thoughtful constitutional analysis. Rather, five 
activist Justices were predetermined to achieve their desired 
outcome regardless of the rule of law as it has been practiced in 
the United States, essentially creating a judicial oligarchy. 
A second concern emerges over judicial impartiality. In 
light of language in the United States Code on judicial conflicts 
of interest,145 a troubling aspect of the Supreme Court’s holding 
is the non-recusals of Justices Ginsburg and Kagan in 
Obergefell, both of whom have officiated at same-sex unions.146 
Put another way, despite the fact that the Court invalidated 
DOMA in Windsor, to the extent that these justices played 
such formal roles in support of an issue that would soon be 
before them ought to have given them pause to continue 
hearing the case because they had already adopted public 
                                                            
 144  In this regard, Justice Roberts pointed out that eleven States plus the 
District of Columbia modified their laws to permit same-sex unions, Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2611, while Justice Thomas observed that voters in thirty-two of the thirty-five 
states who were afforded the opportunity to redefine marriage retained its traditional 
status as being between one man and one woman, id. at 2638. 
 145  See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2015) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”). 
 146  See Paige Lavender, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Officiates Another Same-
Sex Wedding, Gives a Special Shout-Out to the U.S. Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST 
May 18, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/ruth-bader-ginsburg-gay-
wedding_n_7306584.html; Jarvis Deberry, Wasting Time—and Taxpayer Money—in 
Baton Rouge, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, May 5, 2015, at A 12, 2015 WLNR 
13043951 (reporting that both Justices Ginsburg and Kagan have officiated at same-
sex unions). 
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stances in support of same-sex unions.147 Why these justices did 
not seek to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest, 
let alone a real one, is puzzling at best.148 
Third, even in acknowledging the authority of the Supreme 
Court to interpret the Constitution, a questionable proposition 
in Obergefell, it is important to bear in mind that the Court’s  
rulings are not infallible and it may later recognize that its 
earlier judgments were made in error. Further, one can readily 
concede that Obergefell has not yet risen to the same level of 
infamy as some of the Court’s universally rejected judgments 
on such grave errors discussed in the following paragraph. 
Still, people of good faith must hope that proponents of the new 
definition of marriage do not push their views to the extreme in 
seeking to remove the long engrained American ideal of 
religious freedom from the marketplace of ideas. 
In terms of egregious holdings, one needs to look only at the 
Supreme Court’s most notorious judgments. While in no way 
comparing the grave injustices associated with slavery,149 racial 
segregation, whether in railway cars150 or in schools,151 or 
discrimination based on national origin during a time of war,152 
or discovering a right to abortion,153 these opinions reveal that, 
as humans, the Justices are fallible products of their times. As 
such, Justices are often shaped by the dominant social and 
political perspectives of their day such that they rule without 
regard to the Constitution, thereby rendering judgments that, 
in retrospect, are acknowledged as having been unwise at best. 
Surely, individuals who wish to enter into same-sex unions, 
form families, inherit property, visit one another when ill, and 
share many other aspects of life of which the Justices wrote, 
                                                            
 147   See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (Justice 
Scalia recused himself because he criticized the judgement of the Ninth Circuit for 
invalidating the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.). 
 148   See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/mcpr. 
authcheckdam.pdf (While not suggesting that these justices violated any professional 
code of ethics, it is worth noting that Canon 9 of the American Bar Association’s Code 
of Ethics is that “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional 
Impropriety.”). 
 149   Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (current or former slaves lacked 
standing to litigate whether the could gain citizenship). 
 150   Plessy v. Ferguson, 186 U.S. 357 (1896). 
 151   Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 75 (1927); Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
 152   Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. 
 153   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  133 (1973) (finding a right to abortion). 
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should retain the freedom to do so. Insofar as these are related 
to, but distinct from education per se, it is important to bear in 
mind that litigation is arising over whether individuals who 
entered same sex unions can work in faith based institutions 
and whether their children can enroll in these schools.154 As 
such, in failing to ensure that this respect is bilateral, 
Obergefell creates the risk that the Supreme Court’s order may 
set in motion a process designed to bludgeon religious freedom 
by subjecting believers in traditional marriage to nothing short 
of persecution for faithfully adhering to their long and deeply 
held religious beliefs. Such a consequence would be hostile to 
the First Amendment and the basic principles on which the 
United States was founded. 
With the preceding as a backdrop, the next section of this 
article examines institutional concerns associated with the 
potential implementation of Obergefell and possible responses 
to the challenges they present. Faith-based institutions face at 
least six major challenges in the post-Obergefell world. These 
matters are inter-related concerns posed by the intolerance of 
progressives, and are likely to remain in play until institutions 
and people of faith are protected from threats of vilification and 
reprisal for remaining true to their long held beliefs on 
marriage. 
The first concern was highlighted at the outset of this 
article during the oral argument in Obergefell. In a manner 
consistent with the outcome in Bob Jones,155 Solicitor General 
Verrilli suggested that a potential outcome of the Court’s 
dramatic redefinition of marriage would be that the federal 
tax-exempt status of religious institutions for refusing to bow 
to its demands may be at risk.156 While conceding that the state 
tax status of faith-based institutions was not at issue, it seems 
likely that such challenges will not be long in coming. The 
Solicitor General made his remark even though the definition 
of marriage he helped to invalidate via judicial fiat was, as 
noted, almost universally accepted in the United States barely 
fifteen or twenty years ago. Consequently, individuals who 
believe in marriage as being between one man and one woman 
now risk having their faith proscribed and vilified as 
                                                            
 154   See discussion below at note 225 and accompanying text. 
 155  Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574. 
 156  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626. 
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discrimination, no matter how long or deeply held these 
religious convictions are. 
As evidence of the intensity of the ongoing battle over 
religious freedom, at least one opponent sued the Catholic 
Church157 in an attempt to deny it aid in light of its pro-life 
positions in response to abortion.158 Still other antagonists have 
sought to have the Catholic Church classified as a hate group 
in light of its stance with regard to homosexuality,159 thereby 
demonstrating their own brand of intolerance while quick to 
cast the first stone, as it were, at others.160 The threat of 
governmental overreaching through such statutes and 
regulations with the potential to force many faith-based 
services out of operation runs the risk of standing the 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom long respected 
by the American judiciary on their proverbial ears. 
Second, one wonders whether the federal government will 
seek to withhold financial aid, whether for direct research 
                                                            
 157  The Catholic Church is by no means alone in being singled out for criticism 
for its beliefs. For instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center has demonstrated broad 
anti-Christian attitudes without regard to particular denominations within 
Christianity in light of its difference of opinion with regard to a variety of issues. See 
Matt Barber, Bloody Hands: The Southern Christian Poverty Law Center, 
TOWNLALL.COM (Feb. 11, 2013), http://townhall.com/columnists/mattbarber/2013/02/11/ 
bloody-hands-the-southern-poverty-law-center-n1509321/page/full/ (“‘The Southern 
Poverty Law Center has a long history of maliciously slandering pro-family groups 
with language and labels that incite hatred and undermine civil discourse,’ said Mat 
Staver, founder and chairman of Liberty Counsel.”); see also Katie Yoder, Networks 
Ignore FRC Shooter’s use of SPLC ‘Hate Map’: ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN Hide Latest 
on Shooting at Conservative Group, MEDIA RESEARCH CTR CULTURE (Feb. 7, 2013, 3:47 
PM), http://www.mrc.org/articles/networks-ignore-frc-shooters-use-splc-hate-map 
(detailing how the mainstream media failed to report that the map a man used to 
locate the headquarters of the Family Research Center in Washington, D.C., where he 
shot and injured a guard, was created at the SPLC; the map also identified the 
locations of the offices of groups with which the SPLC disagreed). 
 158  Abortion Rights Mobilization v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990) (affirming that a pro-abortion group lacked 
standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church based on its 
pro-life teachings). 
 159  See Mary Beth Baker, An Assault on Freedom of Religion: Discrimination is 
Wrong Even Against Traditional Christian Beliefs, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/23/an-assault-on-freedom-of-religion/; 
see also Michelle Bauman, White House Petitioned to Label Catholic Church a “Hate 
Group,” CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 4, 2013, 4:09 AM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/white-house-petitioned-to-label-catholic-
church-a-hate-group/. 
 160  See John 8.7 (Jerusalem Bible, 1966 translation) (“‘If there is one of you who 
has not sinned, let him be the first to throw a stone at her’.”) (the story of the woman 
caught in adultery). 
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grants for faculty and graduate students, or indirectly in the 
forms of Pell grants and guaranteed student loans for tuition.161 
Such an approach, albeit not identical, arose shortly after the 
Supreme Court ruled in Windsor and Hollingsworth. President 
Obama had issued an Executive Order barring federal 
contractors, including those working with religious institutions, 
from what it describes as “discrimination” based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.162 Insofar as the President 
ignored pleas to include a good-faith exception for bona fide 
occupational qualifications such as under Title VII, the Order 
raises a potential conundrum for employers in faith-based 
educational institutions.163 
In a state context, the City Council in Washington, D.C. 
unanimously passed a law which threatens religious freedom 
by a thirteen-to-nothing vote on December 2, 2014.164 This law 
repealed the sexual orientation discrimination exemption 
previously available to faith-based schools. The mayor signed 
the Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014 into law on 
January 25, 2015,165 even as critics asked Congress to 
intervene, decrying its potential to limit religious freedom.166 
This law revokes religious liberty protections Congress enacted 
in the Nation’s Capital Religious Liberty and Academic 
Freedom Act.167 Under the new law, “the term ‘human rights 
                                                            
 161  See, e.g., Alternative to student loans, but no replacement, MT. VERNON REG.-
NEWS (Ill.) (July 31, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.register-news.com/ 
opinion/alternative-to-student-loans-but-no-replacement/article_02918f9a-b735-5fb0-
a26c-ac95d3f2a323.html (discussing the impact of alternatives on schools such as 
“Gordon College, a Christian school in Massachusetts that was at risk of losing 
its accreditation because the college opposes ‘homosexual practice.’”).  
 162  79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/07/23/2014-17522/further-amendments-
to-executive-order-11478-equal-employment-opportunity-in-the-federal-government. 
 163  DC Repeals Religious Schools’ Exemption from Law on Homosexuality, 
CATHOLICCULTURE.ORG (Dec. 5, 2014), www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/ 
index.cfm?storyid=23439. 
 164  Id. 
 165  The bill can be found at Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014, D.C. Act 20-
605 (Jan. 25, 2015), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/31754/B20-0803-SignedAct.pdf. 
 166  Editorial: Congress Should Block Two D.C. Laws that Undermine Religious 
Freedom, CATH. STANDARD (D.C.) (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:31 PM),  
http://cathstan.org/Content/News/News/Article/Editorial-Congress-should-block-two-D-
C-laws-that-undermine-religious-freedom/2/2/6506. 
 167  Also known as the Armstrong Act: Pub. L. No 100–462, § 145, 102 Stat 2269-
14 (1988), this law was enacted essentially to overturn Gay Rights Coalition v. 
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (finding that officials at a Roman 
Catholic University could not deny tangible benefits to members of gay student groups 
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law’ means District or federal laws related to discrimination by 
reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital 
status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender 
identity or expression, familial status, [and] family 
responsibilities.”168 Although some institutions of higher 
education have voluntarily invited pro-abortion speakers to 
address campus gatherings in violation of Roman Catholic 
Church teachings,169 the next step may well be to attempt to 
require faith-based educational institutions, from elementary 
schools to colleges and universities, to recognize, provide 
funding for, and/ or allow the use of facilities by groups 
advocating positions directly contrary to their sincerely held 
religious beliefs pertaining to marriage and sexuality, refusing 
to provide legal protection for those who seek to live out their 
values and beliefs, regardless of the good they do in educating 
children.170 
As discussed throughout the second half of this article, 
similar developments elsewhere present threats to religious 
freedom. It is conceivable that religious schools run the risk of 
having their rights trammelled if they are required to recognize 
and accommodate these relationships despite their deeply and 
long-held beliefs that same-sex marriage is inconsistent with 
their teachings. However, some states take an opposite 
approach and can use state laws to protect believers and their 
institutions. For example, the governor of Michigan signed a 
bill into law to “prevent faith-based agencies from having 
policies forced on them that violate their religious beliefs, 
                                                                                                                                     
on the basis of their sexual orientation.). 
 168  Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (2)(A), supra note 183. 
 169  Justin Petrisek, Georgetown’s Planned Parenthood Event Poses Danger to 
Students, Ignores USCCB’s Warnings, CATHOLIC EDUCATION DAILY (March 10, 2016, 
12:30 PM), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/CatholicEducationDaily/Details 
Page/tabid/102/ArticleID/4761/Georgetown%E2%80%99s-Planned-Parenthood-Event-
Poses-Danger-to-Students-Ignores-USCCB%E2%80%99s-Warnings.aspx (commenting 
on inviting the organization’s president to speak). 
 170  A recent example of the threat posed to Christians emerged recently in 
Georgia where the governor, bowing to pressure from the business community and gay 
groups, vetoed a law that would have protected religious liberty. Jim Galloway, How 
state’s movie biz has muddled ‘religious liberty’ fight, ATLANTA J. CONSTIT, March 31, 
2016, at BI, 2016 WLNR 9746045. Among other provisions, the law would have 
protected religious leaders who refused to perform same sex unions, institutions that 
refused to hire or retain individuals who did not comport with their beliefs, and 
organizations refusing to rent space to groups for events they found objectionable. 
Available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20152016/160915.pdf. 
2.Russo.Proof2.263-308.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/2/16  5:46 PM 
2] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND OBERGEFELL 295 
 
which have resulted in agencies closing in Massachusetts, 
Illinois, California, and Washington, D.C.”171 
Third, as has already happened, credentialing agencies 
have threatened faith-based colleges and universities with the 
denial of accreditation if they refuse to accept same-sex unions 
and the gay lifestyle as the norm despite their beliefs in 
Biblical norms. For example, although Gordon College in 
Massachusetts172 appears to have avoided such the loss of its 
accreditation due to its stance on same-sex unions for the 
present,173 similar threats are likely to emerge.174 
                                                            
 171  Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Bills Putting Michigan Children First in Adoption, 
Foster Care Practices, GOVERNOR RICK SNYDER REINVENTING MICHIGAN (June 11, 
2015), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0%2c4668%2c7-277—356932—%2c00.html. For 
a commentary on this situation, see Todd Stearns, It’s open season on people of faith in 
Georgia, FOXNEWS.COM (March 28, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/ 
03/28/its-open-season-on-people-faith-in-georgia.html 
 172  See, e.g., Emma Green, Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of Religious 
Freedom, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (July 27, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/legal-rights-lgbt-discrimination-
religious-freedom-claims/399278/ (discussing Gordon College); Paul Leighton, Gordon 
Accreditation Still in ‘Good Standing’ After Evaluation, THE SALEM NEWS (May 5, 
2015),  http://www.salemnews.com/news/local_news/gordon-accreditation-still-in-good-
standing-after-evaluation/article_ca7a7a3e-7a37-5df6-965f-ff0cb2ce6e1c.html; Michael 
Worley, My View: We Must Protect Religious Schools from Legal Threats, DESERET 
NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865614952/Legal-
threats-on-religious-schools.html?pg=all. 
 173  Kimberly Scharfenberger, Christian College Stands for Religious Freedom, 
Catholic College Retaliates by Cancelling Sports Matches, CATHOLIC EDUC. DAILY (Mar. 
11, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/CatholicEducationDaily/ 
DetailsPage/tabid/102/ArticleID/4063/Christian-College-Stands-for-Religious-Freedom-
Catholic-College-Retaliates-by-Cancelling-Sports-Matches.aspx (Interestingly, a 
Catholic institution in Massachusetts, Emmanuel College cancelled its athletic 
schedule with Gordon after its president was one of fourteen signatories of a letter to 
President Obama requesting a religious exemption from his Executive Order, supra 
note 175, banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.). 
 174  A similar controversy originated in British Columbia, Canada, involving 
Trinity Western Law School, a Christian institution, which was denied accreditation 
because of its teachings on gay lifestyles and same-sex unions. See Mark A. Kellner, 
Can America’s Faith-Based Law Schools Restrict Sexual Activity to Heterosexual 
Marriage?, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://national.deseretnews.com/article/3420/can-americas-faith-based-law-schools-
restrict-sexual-activity-to-heterosexual-marriage.html (addressing, in part, the travails 
of Trinity Western, noting that the “Nova Scotia Supreme Court declare[d] the 
province’s barristers’ society could not refuse to license graduates of 
Trinity Western’s law school because it didn’t like the school’s covenant”); Ian Mulgrew, 
TWU Covenant not Unlawful, Nova Scotia Judge Rules in Law School Case, 
VANCOUVER SUN (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.vancouversun.com/story_print.html?id=10768570&sponsor=.=; Hank Jager, 
Are They Hypocrites?, KITCHENER-WATERLOO REC. (Nov. 27, 2014), 
http://www.therecord.com/opinion-story/5157738-are-they-hypocrites-/ (indicating that 
British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia refused to recognize Trinity Western 
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Fourth, consistent with the outcome in Christian Legal 
Society, college and university officials, along with student 
organizations on campuses,175 have sought to deny access 
and/or recognition to Christian groups. While university 
officials subsequently reversed course and allowed faith-based 
student groups to retain the religious requirements for their 
leaders at Tufts,176 similar controversies are likely to continue. 
Earlier in the year, fourteen out of thirty Christians at 
Vanderbilt University stated that that they would leave 
campus over the same issue,177 rather than comply with its 
“policy require[ing] Christian and other religious organizations 
receiving student fees to drop policies banning gays or other 
members who are outside the organizations’ core beliefs.178  The 
Vanderbilt policy prompted members of Congress to ask 
officials to exempt faith-based organizations from the 
institutional “all-comers policy” on the basis that it 
discriminates against religious beliefs.179 In response, the 
legislatures in Idaho,180 North Carolina,181 Ohio,182 Tennessee,183 
                                                                                                                                     
graduates); Law Society Council Upholds Trinity Western Accreditation, CBC NEWS 
WORLDWIDE (Jan. 9, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-
brunswick/law-society-council-upholds-trinity-western-accreditation-1.2895025 
(reporting that law graduates of Trinity Western would be allowed to practice in New 
Brunswick); Mark Jaskela, TWU Ruling Shows Intolerance; Fear, Prejudice and 
Slippery Ethics Behind Banning Christian Law School, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 19, 
2014, at B9, 2014 WLNR 35965146 (reporting that British Columbia revoked the 
school’s accreditation). 
 175  See Katherine Landergan, Group of Evangelicals at Tufts Fights a ‘De-
recognizing’ Effort, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2012, 2012 WLNR 22802278 (reporting on 
efforts to de-recognize an evangelical student group because opponents objected to its 
religious views). 
 176  Peter Schworm, Tufts Shifts Course, Grants More Leeway to Student 
Religious Groups, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2012, 2012 WLNR 26033344. 
 177  Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy, 
TENNESSEAN, May 8, 2012, 2012 WLNR 9663350. 
 178  Andy Sher, Social Issues Stole the Spotlight This Year in the Tennessee 
Legislature, TIMES FREE PRESS (May 6, 2012), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/news/story/2012/may/06/a1-social-issues-stole-
spotlight-in-legislature-tn/77238/. 
 179  Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy, 
TENNESSEAN, May 8, 2012, 2012 WLNR 9663350 (reporting that the legislature of 
Tennessee enacted a law designed to ban all-comers policies, allowing campus groups 
to grant membership only to those who share their beliefs and missions). 
 180  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33–107D (2015) (Campus access for religious students). 
 181  Student Organizations/Rights & Recognition, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 28, 
SSBS. 719 (Student organizations/ rights and recognition), Senate Bill 719 / S.L. 2014-
28. 
 182  OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.023 (2011) (Religious student group benefits). 
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and Virginia184 have acted to protect religious freedom by 
banning discrimination by officials in public institutions 
against faith-based student organizations.185 
The fifth question is already playing itself out in faith-
based schools when same-sex couples seek to enroll their 
children in these institutions.186 When these incidents occur, 
one cannot help but to wonder why same-sex marriage activists 
seem to be singling out Christian schools, particularly if the 
parents are openly living in violation of church teachings, and 
businesses, when there are undoubtedly others who would 
readily make their services available without controversy. 
A sixth development raising potential dire consequences for 
religious institutions involves the actions of Southern Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, a firm which provides coverage to 
“more than 8,400 churches.”187 The company’s vice president of 
                                                                                                                                     
 183  TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2015) (Religious student groups; access to 
school facilities).  
 184  VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:12 (2015) (Student organizations; rights and 
recognition). See also Va. Passes Ban on Campus ‘All-Comers’ Policy, CBN NEWS (Feb. 
26, 2013), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2013/February/Va-Passes-Ban-on-Campus-
All-Comers-Policy/ (reporting that lawmakers in Virginia enacted a law designed to 
ban all-comers policies, allowing campus groups to limit membership to those who 
share their beliefs and missions). 
 185  For coverage of this issue, see Harry Painter, The Supreme Court 
Endangered Christian Student Groups, but Some States are Coming to the Rescue, 
JOHN WILLIAM POPE CTR. POLICY (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=3077#.VFVEYfnF93U. 
 186  See, e.g., Dave Bohon, Homosexual Couple Sues Christian Preschool for 
Rejecting Son as Student, NEW AMERICAN (Dec. 24, 2012), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/14013-homosexual-
couple-sues-christian-preschool-for-rejecting-son-as-student; Erica Meltzer, Denver 
Archbishop Defends Sacred Heart of Jesus’ Decision on Lesbians’ Children at Boulder 
Preschool, DAILY CAMERA (Mar. 13, 2010, 10:52 PM), 
http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14640646; Lisa Wangsness, O’Malley Post Cites “Good 
of the Child”: Cardinal Backs Hingham Catholic School Decision, Offers to Help Gay 
Couple, BOSTON GLOBE (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/05/20/omalley_post_cite
s_good_of_the_child/. See also Charlie Danaher, Tolerance Goes Both Ways, DAILY 
CAMERA (Mar. 13, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14665405; Electra 
Draper, Denver Archbishop Chaput’s Right-eous Stands, DENVER POST (May 21, 2010, 
1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/frontpage/ci_15130873 (concerning a 
dispute in Colorado. Bishop Chaput has since been named Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of the Philadelphia Archdiocese, see http://archphila.org). 
 187  Henry Stern, SSM & Church Insurance, INSUREBLOG (July 13, 2015, 9:30 
AM), http://insureblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/ssm-church-insurance.html (quoting 
Kemberlee Kay, Churches Refusing to Perform Same Sex Marriages may be Denied 
Liability Insurance, LEGAL INSURRECTION (July 10, 2015, 1:25 PM), 
http://legalinsurrection.com/2015/07/churches-refusing-to-perform-same-sex-marriages-
may-be-denied-liability-insurance/). 
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underwriting sent a memorandum to clients informing them 
that the firm would not provide liability insurance if they are 
sued for refusing to permit same-sex ceremonies to be 
performed on their premises because their actions would be in 
violation of the law; refusals of coverage would also likely not 
provide coverage for fines and related legal costs. To the extent 
that the owners of private wedding chapels188 and other 
businesses189 such as bakers,190 photographers,191 trolley 
companies,192 and other businesses ceased operations rather 
than transgress their faith this suggests that faith-based 
educational institutions may well face the same draconian 
alternatives. Put another way, faith-based schools may be 
                                                            
 188  For one such incident, see Keith Cousins, Judge Hears Hitching Post Case, 
COEUR D’ALENE PRESS (July 21, 2015), http://www.cdapress.com/news/ 
local_news/article_7094264b-659d-5a65-a271-51073b4c02bb.html (reporting on a suit 
filed by the owners of a wedding chapel who are allegedly being forced to violate their 
religious beliefs by performing ceremonies for same-sex couples in light of the city’s 
anti-discrimination ordinance even though they argued that they are entitled to an 
exemption because they are a religious corporation). See also Tim Rohwer, Huckabee: 
U.S. Supreme Court Should Have Term Limits, DAILY NONPAREIL  (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.nonpareilonline.com/news/local/huckabee-u-s-supreme-court-should-have-
term-limits/article_e45d1171-b185-5dcf-99d8-34ac2efa3c59.html (including a report 
that a couple had to close its wedding chapel rather than be subject to fines for refusing 
to perform services for same-sex couples). 
 189  See Bob Ellis, Homosexual Activists Driving Store Out of Business, AMERICAN 
CLARION (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.americanclarion.com/2012/12/07/homosexual-
activists-driving-store-out-of-business-15186/ (also reporting that a Catholic priest who 
“was investigated by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) for the ‘crime’ 
of teaching what the Bible says about homosexual behavior (that it is a sin) and 
marriage (that it is between a man and a woman).”). 
 190  See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2015 WL 4760453 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2015) (upholding a fine against the owner of a bakery for refusing to provide a cake for 
a same-sex union even though the initial filing in the case by the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission did not name the owner and cited the wrong portion of state law; the court 
applied the “relation back” doctrine to justify its action.). See also Mark Hemmingway, 
Free to Shut Up: The Collision of Religious Liberty and Gay Rights in Oregon, THE 
WEEKLY STANDARD (July 20, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/free-to-shut-
up/article/988096 (reporting on the $130,000 fine imposed on a bakery for refusing to 
provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple) 
 191  Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 U.S. 
1789 (2014) (affirming that a photographer’s refusal to provide her professional 
services at a same-sex commitment ceremony because doing so would have violated her 
deeply held religious beliefs discriminated against the customer on the basis of sexual 
orientation in violation of state law). 
 192  Erin Cox, It’s Back to the Bam for Wedding Trolleys, THE BALT. SUN, Dec. 26, 
2012, at A1, 2012 WLNR 27914985 (reporting that the owner of a company whose 
trolleys were used in marriage festivities chose to forgo what had been a profitable 
business activity and shut down operations rather than run the risk of having to serve 
same-sex couples in the wake of a recently approved change in state law legalizing 
such relationships). 
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charged with discrimination if the refuse to violate their long, 
deeply-held religious belief in marriage as being between one 
man and one woman or being subjected to legal sanctions if 
they refuse to permit their facilities to be used in a manner 
with which they disagree. 
IV. RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
Following Obergefell, faith-based educational institutions 
that face the threat of the potential loss of their tax exempt 
status, among other penalties, may very well be unable to 
continue to operate without such assistance because this would 
have such a negative impact on their finances, thereby 
harming untold numbers of students, clients, and their 
employees. Obergefell might also render persons of faith subject 
to vilification for remaining true to their religious beliefs. As 
such, leaders in faith-based institutions, believers, and all 
people of good faith (even if they are non-believers), working in 
conjunction with their attorneys to protect their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of religion, may wish to ponder 
the following five options. 
First, in the wake of Obergefell, and the threats to faith-
based educational institutions and their employees just 
reviewed, a measure of judicial relief could be on the horizon in 
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open 
Society International, Inc. (“Alliance”).193 In Alliance, the 
Supreme Court enunciated the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.194 Pursuant to this doctrine, the constitutionality of a 
condition for receiving a subsidy, or in terms more applicable to 
religious institutions such as schools, tax exemptions for 
themselves and tax deductions for donors, depends on whether 
the condition(s) imposed by the government define or reach 
outside of a program. In other words, the “government may 
impose conditions that define the limits of the particular 
program, [but] may not impose” conditions that reach outside 
the program.195 While, in theory, this means that faith-based 
                                                            
 193  Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
 194  Id. at 2327. 
 195  For discussions of this concept, see William E. Thro, The Limits of Christian 
Legal Society, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. 124, 127 (2014), 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/Thro_2014_35.pdf. See also William 
E. Thro, Undermining Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 295 EDUC. L. REP. 867 
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institutions should be able to preserve their freedom of religion, 
it seems doubtful that the majority from Obergefell would be 
willing to apply Alliance insofar as they have already 
demonstrated their unwillingness to respect the deeply held 
religious beliefs of those who disagree with their dictates. 
Concomitantly, the seemingly irreconcilable difference 
between Alliance, which limits the imposition of governmental 
conditions on the receipt of aid, and Bob Jones, which denied 
tax exempt status to institutions engaged in discriminatory 
practices based on race, needs to be addressed. In other words, 
there is a need for federal statutory intervention (addressed in 
the following paragraph), or additional litigation, to clarify the 
rights of faith-based institutions when confronted by legal 
compulsions to violate their long-held sincere beliefs or risk the 
loss of aid by being charged with discrimination in violation of 
the law. 
Second, in an attempt to ward off progressive intolerance 
against faith-based institutions and individuals whose religious 
beliefs adhere to the millennia-old definition of marriage as 
being between one man and one woman, perhaps the best 
alternative to protect religious freedom is an act of Congress. 
To this end, Republican Mike Lee of Utah authored a bill he 
introduced in the Senate,196 joined by Republican Congressman 
Raul Labrador of Idaho and others in the House of 
Representatives.197 In the hope of enacting the First 
Amendment Defense Act (FADA)198 by mid-July, 115 
Republicans199 signed on as co-sponsors of the proposed bill. 
                                                                                                                                     
(2013). 
 196  S. 1598, “To prevent discriminatory treatment of any person on the basis of 
views held with respect to marriage,” was introduced in the 1st session of the Senate in 
the 114th Congress on June 17, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/senate-bill/1598/text. 
 197  H.R. RES. 399, “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the House should consider legislation to protect traditional marriage and prevent 
taxpayer funding of abortion,” was introduced in the 1st session of the Senate in the 
114th Congress on July 29, 2015. Earlier, H.R. 2802, “To prevent discriminatory 
treatment of any person on the basis of views held with respect to marriage,” was 
introduced in the 1st session of the House in the 114th Congress on June 17, 2015. 
 198  Walsh, supra note 9 (pointing out that the proposed FADA introduced by 
Senator Mike Lee and Representative Raul Labrador seeks to ensure that the federal 
government does not discriminate against Americans of faith based on their religious 
beliefs and practices concerning marriage). 
 199  See also Scott Wong, ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill Picks up Momentum in House, 
THE HILL (July 12, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/247599-religious-
freedom-bill-picks-up-momentum. 
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Aimed at safeguarding religious liberty, the FADA would 
offer broad-based protection to persons of faith as it attempts to 
forge something of a compromise between those whose views on 
marriage differ radically. On the one hand, the FADA does not 
question or attack the holding in Obergefell. On the other hand, 
the FADA would prevent the federal government from 
discriminating against people of faith, and others, who believe 
that marriage is a relationship between one man and one 
woman. Interestingly, this language seems to reflect Justice 
Kennedy’s attempt to allay the concerns of believers about the 
future of religious freedom.200 
After citing its proposed law’s short title201 and findings,202 
FADA sets forth its key provisions.203 The remaining sections of 
the FADA address judicial relief,204 rules of construction,205 and 
                                                            
 200  See supra notes 79, 114 and accompanying text. 
 201  H.R. 2802 was introduced in the 1st session of the House in the 114th 
Congress on June 17, 2015, § 1. S 1598, which is identical, was introduced in Senate on 
the same day, June 17, 2015. 
 202  Id. § 2. 
 203  Id. § 3. It reads,  
SEC. 3. PROTECTION OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal 
Government shall not take any discriminatory action against a person, wholly or 
partially on the basis that such person believes or acts in accordance with a 
religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the 
union of one man and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to 
such a marriage. 
(b) Discriminatory Action Defined.—As used in subsection (a), a discriminatory 
action means any action taken by the Federal Government to— 
(1) alter in any way the Federal tax treatment of, or cause any tax, penalty, or 
payment to be assessed against, or deny, delay, or revoke an exemption from 
taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of, any person 
referred to in subsection (a); 
(2) disallow a deduction for Federal tax purposes of any charitable contribution 
made to or by such person; 
(3) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise deny any Federal grant, 
contract, subcontract, cooperative agreement, loan, license, certification, 
accreditation, employment, or other similar position or status from or to such 
person; 
(4) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise deny any benefit under a 
Federal benefit program from or to such person; or 
(5) otherwise discriminate against such person. 
(c) Accreditation; Licensure; Certification.—The Federal Government shall 
consider accredited, licensed, or certified for purposes of Federal law any person 
that would be accredited, licensed, or certified, respectively, for such purposes but 
for a determination against such person wholly or partially on the basis that the 
person believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction 
that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman, 
or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage. 
 204  Id. § 4. 
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definitions.206 Given the strong support of President Obama207 
and most Democrats for same-sex unions,208 not to mention 
activist groups209 hoping to extinguish religious liberty, the 
FADA may face an uphill battle to passage. 
At the same time, defenders of religious freedom should 
vigorously oppose the so-called Equality Act, co-sponsored by 
more than 160 democrat members of the House,210 filed less 
than a month after Obergefell was handed down. The 
innocuous sounding title of this proposed law aside, it would 
present a range of risks to religious freedom. Among its 
provisions, this law would create new classifications protecting 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” while not affording 
exemptions for faith-based organizations that define marriage 
as being between one man and one woman rooted in their long-
held sincere religious beliefs. In addition, this law would deny 
religious organizations exemptions contained in the proposed 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act,211 adding that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)212 cannot be used as 
                                                                                                                                     
 205  Id. § 5. 
 206  Id. § 6. 
 207  See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Barack Obama: ‘The First Gay President’? 
Newsweek Bestows Provocative Title on Barack Obama After he 
Shows Support for Same-Sex Marriage, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 15, 2012, 2012 
WLNR 23620204; President Obama Becomes the First American Leader 
to Support Same-Sex Marriage, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 10, 2012, at A1, 2012 WLNR 
9800950. 
 208  See, e.g., Alex Roarty, Democrats to Officially Back Gay Marriage, NAT’L J. 
ONLINE, June 30, 2012, 2012 WLNR 16364137; Democrats Back Gay Marriage, COM. 
APPEAL, Aug. 10, 2012, at 3, 2012 WLNR 19252814. 
 209  In a development that should come as no surprise, the American Civil 
Liberties Union announced that it would not defend individuals with claims under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in disputes involving same-sex unions. See Jim 
Galloway, Political Insider Blog: ACLU Disavows Support for Federal ‘Religious 
Liberty’ Law, ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 29, 2015), 
http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2015/06/29/aclu-disavows-support-for-federal-religious-
liberty-law/. 
 210  This proposed Act was introduced in the House as H.R. 3185, and Senate as 
S. 1858 on July 23, 2015. Without being noted as such, this bill is apparently a 
successor act to The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 5(A) (2013), designed to prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. For a slightly more detailed discussion of 
this proposed law, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom in the United States: “When 
You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It,” 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363 (2013) nn.223–26 
and accompanying text. 
 211  H.R. 3185 § 1101 (2015–16). 
 212  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–4. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(invalidating the RFRA as it applied to States). For representative commentaries on 
this case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Flores v. City of Boerne: Testing the 
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a defense for challenging its provisions.213 
Unlike the FADA, though, which seeks to mediate the 
differences between those with opposing views of marriage, the 
proposed Equality Act takes on a different tenor. If anything, 
the Equality Act comes across more as a declaration of the 
ultimate victory for those who wish to obliterate any dissent 
over the definition of marriage. Given the current make-up of 
Congress, it seems that this bill is also unlikely to be adopted 
at this time. Even so, the Equality Act serves as warning shot 
fired across the bow of religious freedom. 
Third, the role of the federal RFRA214 in conjunction with its 
state statutory215 counterparts, perhaps coupled with 
gubernatorial Executive Orders,216 may offer a measure of 
protection to faith-based institutions and their employees in 
their collective profession of the belief that marriage is between 
one man and one woman. The federal RFRA, in particular, may 
come into play if and when President Obama seeks to impose 
Executive Orders217 implementing Obergefell in relation to 
faith-based institutions, particularly schools, colleges, and 
universities, because such an action may implicate the 
institutions’ ability to file free exercise rights claims with a 
                                                                                                                                     
Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 115 EDUC. L. REP. 593 
(1997); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002). 
 213  Supra note 210, §223, 1107. 
 214  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. 
 215  As of March, 2015, at least twenty states had religious freedom laws in effect. 
Campbell Robertson & Richard Pérez-Peña, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset Capitols 
in Arkansas and Indiana, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/religious-freedom-restoration-act-arkansas-
indiana.html?_r=0. For examples of such laws, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41–1493 
to–1493.02; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-491; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–571b; FLA. STAT. §§ 
761.01–.05; IDAHO CODE §§ 73–401 to–404; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1–99; IND. CODE 
34-13-9-1 et seq.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 466; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.302–307; N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 28–22–1 to 28–22–5; OKLA. STAT. Tit. 51, §§ 251–258; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
2401–2407; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42–80.1–1 to–4; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1–32–10 to–60; 
TENN. CODE § 4–1–407; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 110.001–012; UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 63l–5–101 to–403; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57–1 to–2.02. 
 216  See, e.g.,  Emily Lane, Louisiana’s Religious Freedom Bill Effectively Defeated 
in Committee, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 19, 2015, updated May 28, 2015), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/05/louisianas_religious_freedom_b.html 
(also reporting that Governor Bobby Jindal signed an Executive Order into effect on 
May 19, 2015, to prevent the government from taking such actions as revoking licenses 
and tax benefits based on the beliefs of individuals or institutions that marriage is 
between one man and one woman); See also Executive Order BJ 15-8, Marriage and 
Conscience Order, http://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm. 
 217  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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reasonable chance of success on the merits. Moreover, working 
together, the federal and state218 RFRAs may be able to 
safeguard religious institutions by forbidding governmental 
intervention, placing substantial burdens on the institutions’ 
rights to the free exercise of religion absent compelling state 
interests that are achieved by the least restrictive means 
possible. 
Fourth, another possible course of action for faith-based 
institutions may arise under Hosanna-Tabor, wherein the 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of Church 
leaders rather than the EEOC to decide who qualifies as a 
minister.219 More specifically, insofar as the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld the authority of religious officials to 
determine who qualifies as a minister, when proponents of 
same-sex unions file suits alleging discrimination because 
leaders in faith-based institutions refuse to hire them or their 
partners because they are not living lifestyles compatible with 
their religious missions, then this case should offer a strong 
defense.220 
A fifth and final response available to critics of Obergefell is 
emerging in the form of non-violent civil disobedience.221 
Apparently, the first post-Obergefell instance of civil 
disobedience arose when the county clerk in Rowan County, 
Kentucky, refused to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples and unsuccessfully sought judicial relief based on her 
sincerely held religious beliefs.222 Subsequently, a judge in 
                                                            
 218  For a brief commentary on state RFRAs with a focus on Indiana’s statute, see 
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Disobedience, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
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Oregon refused to perform same-sex unions by also relying on 
his deeply held religious beliefs under the First Amendment.223 
Further, a jurist in Tennessee denied a divorce petition in a 
clear protest against Obergefell, rooted in his contention that 
the Supreme Court has the duty to clarify when a marriage is 
no longer a marriage before he could rule.224  
The dispute over the refusal of the county clerk, Kim Davis, 
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and subsequent 
jail time225 garnered widespread media coverage. The time that 
she spent in jail is a penalty now being called into question for 
its severity226 as she has since been released.227 Davis was 
charged with being in contempt of court because she followed 
her conscience, amid ad hominem attacks on her person.228 Her 
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experience, no doubt, presages later criticisms of others who 
stand up for their faiths. Why wiser, or at least cooler, heads 
did not prevail is not clear. Nor is it clear why officials seeking 
to employ the least restrictive means available to serve a 
compelling government interest decided to restrict her right to 
the free exercise of her religious beliefs by, for instance, having 
others issue the license from the outset, something they have 
since done.229 The situation is made more puzzling when it is 
not clear whether the clerk’s refusal to grant licenses rises to 
the level that requires the punishment of incarceration. 230 
Reactions to the stance of the county clerk in Kentucky 
stand in stark contrast to the silence in the face of inaction by 
other public officials who refused to enforce duly enacted laws 
on marriage and did not receive the same treatment.231 If 
anything, silence was deafening insofar as there was a no 
criticism or public outcry when “California’s Governor, attorney 
general, and various other state and local officials responsible 
for enforcing California’s marriage laws. Those officials refused 
to defend the law”232 known as Proposition 8. 
The controversy over Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ballot 
initiative approved by a clear majority of citizens amending the 
state Constitution of California to recognize only marriage 
between a man and a woman as valid, led to its ultimate 
demise in the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hollingsworth.233 
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The presence of such a clear double standard when officials 
who selectively chose not to defend California’s law on 
marriage did so without a word of criticism being uttered is 
unlikely to change because the Supreme Court has taken sides 
in the culture war. Consequently, it might behoove critics of 
Obergefell to point this out constantly in the hope of educating 
the public as to the threats facing religious freedom at the 
hands of duplicitous critics. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States is at a fork in the road where there are 
those who would limit the religious freedom of faith-based 
educational institutions,  their employees, and business owners 
based on their long-term, sincerely held religious beliefs that 
are grounded in millennia of teachings, both religious and 
secular, recognizing marriage as being between one man and 
one woman. Those who seek to limit religious freedom would be 
wise to reflect on the words of Justice Jackson in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette,234 wherein the Supreme 
Court upheld the rights of children who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to refrain from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance 
because it violated their religious beliefs. Justice Jackson 
presciently reasoned: 
freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of 
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the 
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.235 
Opponents of religious liberty have staked out the 
boundaries in what appears to be a looming battle royale, using 
the newly discovered judicial right to same-sex unions that five 
unelected Supreme Court Justices imposed on the United 
States, democracy and the will of the people notwithstanding, 
as their battle cry. Thus, insofar as the future of religious 
freedom under the First Amendment is at stake, particularly 
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as it may impact educational institutions and their employees 
at all levels, it is imperative for believers and others of good 
faith to join together to preserve this most precious of 
American rights. 
One can only hope that as issues come to a head, 
individuals on both sides of the divide in the dispute over 
defining marriage can live, and behave, in a manner 
demonstrating respect for the dignity of each other, even those 
with whom they disagree. To live this way is in line with 
Voltaire’s often quoted dictum: “I disapprove of what you say, 
but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”236 The battle, 
it seems, is soon to be joined. 
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